Decided 1//30/06 by Division I -- Speedy Trial -- Tolling -- State v. Chhom -- Held:  "Is time for trial tolled on a pending King County district court charge while the defendant is incarcerated in the Yakima County jail serving a sentence imposed by a King County municipal court?  We hold it is, and reinstate charges against [the Defendants]."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.

 

Decided 12/8/05 by Division III --the Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Day -- Traffic Stop -- Permissible Search for Officer Safety -- FACTS AND HELD:  "Charlie Day and his wife were parked in a Benton County public access area.  An officer who investigated to see if they had a proper parking permit observed an open handgun case near Mr. Day's feet.
The officer conducted a limited search of the vehicle to find the handgun, which turned out to be stolen.  Mr. Day was arrested and the search of the vehicle incident to the arrest uncovered evidence he was involved in manufacturing methamphetamine.  On appeal from his conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine, former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1) (1998), he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered during the warrantless search of his vehicle.  Because we conclude that the search was justified for officer safety during the investigation of a traffic infraction, we affirm."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 12/1/05 by Division III -- State v. Carlson -- Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Vehicle -- FACTS:  Two individuals separately purchased products lawful to possess.  A store manager knew the two items combined could be used to make methamphetamine and reported the purchase to police.  A law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle in which the two were driving and charged defendant with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine.  HELD:  "We conclude that because police did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it was improper to stop Mr. Carlson's vehicle and the evidence should have been suppressed." Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Judge Schultheis.    Click Here to Read the Dissent by Judge Brown.  When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.

 

Decided 12/1/05 by the Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Miller -- Violation of Domestic Violence Protection Order  --  Validity of Order is Question of Law -- Existence of Order is Question of Fact --HELD:  "We are asked to decide if the validity of a domestic violence no-contact order is an element of the crime of violating such an order.  If the validity of the order is an element of the crime, then it must, of course, be decided by a jury as a matter of fact.  We hold that the 'existence' of a no-contact order is an element of the crime of violating such an order.  However, the 'validity' of the no-contact order is a question of law appropriately within the province of the trial court to decide as part of the court's gate-keeping function.  The trial judge should not permit an invalid, vague, or otherwise inapplicable no-contact order to be admitted into evidence.  Because Clay Jason Miller has not shown that the trial judge erred inadmitting this no-contact order, nor that the order was otherwise invalid or inapplicable, we affirm."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Justice Chambers.  When you have this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 12/1/05 by the Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Morse -- Warrantless Searches -- Who May Give Permission -- HELD:  "Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.  Exceptions to the warrant requirement are jealously and carefully drawn.  Properly obtained, consent
to a warrantless search is one of those carefully drawn exceptions.  Although Robert James Morse was at home, police gained entry into his apartment by obtaining the consent of a houseguest who, with her husband, had been at Morse's apartment for only five days.  The police did not have a search warrant, were looking for another person, and did not obtain Morse's permission to search his apartment until after they found contraband in his bedroom.  The State argues (1) that the houseguest had actual and apparent authority to consent and (2) that the police had no duty to obtain Morse's consent until they came upon him and then only if he objected to the search.  We disagree.  One who has equal or lesser control over a premises does not have authority to consent for those who are present and have equal or greater control.  'Presence' is used in accordance with its ordinary meaning.  Persons are not absent merely because the police do not know they are present, nor are they absent until police have come upon them during a warrantless search.  'Authority' to consent is a matter of status or control and a question of law.  The subjective beliefs and understandings of law enforcement officers are irrelevant to the question of 'authority.'  Law enforcement officers, who seek to conduct a warrantless search based upon the exception of consent, are well advised to ask for the woman and/or man of the house before seeking consent to search a home.  If the man or woman of the house is not present, a brief inquiry could determine the identity of the person present and their authority to give consent; this would give police officers the information needed to properly proceed and to assure protection of constitutional rights. The search of Morse's apartment was unlawful and we reverse."  Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Justice Chambers.  Click Here to Read the Concurring Opinion by Justice Fairhurst.  When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 9/29/05 by the Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Smith -- DWLS 1st -- Suspension as an Habitual Offender -- Necessity of Proving Habitual Offender Status --  HELD:  " . . . Smith now asserts that the State was required to prove not only that his license was revoked on May 7, 2002, but that his license had been revoked due to a finding that he was an habitual traffic offender. . . .   We agree."  Remanded for dismissal.   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.

 

 Decided 8/29/05 by the Division II -- State v. Mote -- No Seizure of Passenger when Officer Asks for Passenger's Name Where Car is Legally Parked in Public Area and No Suspicion of Crime -- State v. Rankin Distinguised --  HELD:  "A police officer pulled his patrol car up behind an occupied car that was legally parked on a residential street with its tail and dome lights on.  He walked up to the driver's side window and requested identifying information from both occupants, who complied.  A warrant check revealed that Curtis Mote, who was in the front passenger seat, had an outstanding warrant.  The officer arrested and searched Mote, and found a small baggie of methamphetamine.  Mote moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that he was illegally seized when the officer asked for his identification.  The trial court denied his motion and held that Mote was not seized until he was arrested.  Mote was subsequently convicted of possession of methamphetamine and appeals.  We affirm."   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 8/16/05 by the Division III --     Yakima v. Skove -- Sentencing Enhancement on Current DUI Based on Prior Deferred Prosecution -- Impact of Blakely v. Washington -- HELD:  "We hold that Blakely does not apply to overcome
existing authority permitting the trial court to enhance Mr. Skov's sentence based upon his deferred prosecution."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


   

On 8/11/05 the Washington Supreme Court issued two opinions significantly clarifying the scope of City of Redmond v. Moore.  In City of Redmond v. Bagby, the various defendants received automatic mandatory driver license suspensions following convictions for reckless driving, vehicular homicide, minor in possession of alcohol and driving while license invalidated.  In none of the cases was the defendant offered a DOL hearing prior to the effective date of the suspension.  In reversing the trial court's dismissal of driving while suspended charges, the Court held:  "Sufficient due process requirements exist for those who have their driver's license suspended based on a criminal conviction.  The statutes that require a mandatory suspension based on a conviction provide a heightened government interest in highway safety and a decreased likelihood of erroneous depravation.  Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Justice Charles Johnson.  Click Here to Read the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Sanders.  The companion case of City of Bremerton v. Hawkins involved a suspension arising from an initial conviction for minor possession of alcohol and the Court reached a result consistent with Moore by upholding the validity of the suspension without a DOL hearing.   Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Justice Charles Johnson.  Click Here to Read the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Sanders.  When you have read any of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

   Decided 8/11/05 by the Washington Supreme Court --State v. Kull --  Warrantless Entry Into Apartment -- Defendant was lawfully seized in the laundry room of an apartment and arrested on an outstanding misdemeanor warrant.  She asked to retrieve her purse from her apartment and an officer followed her friend into the apartment where the officer saw contriband.  HELD:  Negligent Driving 1st Is a Prior Offense for Purpose of Increasing Subsequent DUI Sentence -- State v. Shaffer Overrulled -- HELD:  The trial court did not determine the officer entered the apartment because of concern for officer safety and the defendant's right to privacy wqas "unreasonably invaded."  Conviction REVERSED.  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Justice Madsen. When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.






 

Decided 7/28/05 by the Washington Supreme Court --Walla Walla v. Greene --  Negligent Driving 1st Is a Prior Offense for Purpose of Increasing Subsequent DUI Sentence -- State v. Shaffer Overrulled -- HELD:  This case involves a constitutional challenge to RCW 46.61.5055(12)(a)(v), which defines 'prior offenses' that increase mandatory minimum sentences for certain driving under the influence (DUI) convictions.  Specifically, the constitutional challenge involves whether a 'prior offense' can include a conviction for first degree negligent driving where the conviction was originally charged as DUI.  Walla Walla District Court ruled that the statute violates requirements of due process.  We granted direct review and reverse.  Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Justice Charles Johnson.  Click Here to Read the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Sanders. When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 6/6/05 by the Division I -- State v. Warren --   Amendment to Original Criminal Charge -- When Amendment Relates Back to Original Charge -- HELD:  "An amended criminal charge will relate back to the original charge for purposes of the statute of limitations so long as it arises out of the same facts, and does not substantially broaden the original charge.  Here, the State charged driving under the influence.  Then, after the statute of limitation had passed, the State added an alternative charge of negligent driving, arising out of the same incident.  The amendment related back to the original charge and was properly permitted by the district court judge.  We reverse the superior court's dismissal and reinstate judgment on the alternative charge."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 5/19/05 by the Washington Supreme Court --State v. Pulfrey --  State v. Moore Explained --   When DWLS 3 is Still Constitutional -- This decision, defining the scope of State v. Moore in a significant paragraph of dicta, is probably not particularly relevant in light of the 2005 Legislative amedments to RCW 46.20.289 and 46.20.324(1).  Nevertheless, the Court clearly states in a unanimous opinion, it did not intend Moore to nullify essentially all DWLS 3d charges.  The RCW citations in the Court's opinion have been hyperlinked, allowing you to click on them and go directly to that RCW.   DICTA:  " Pulfrey also claims that his arrest is unlawful because we recently struck down RCW 46.20.289 and .324(1), which mandate suspension of driver's licenses under certain circumstances without a presuspension hearing.  Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664. We determined the statutes were unconstitutional because they did 'not provide adequate procedural safeguards to ensure against the erroneous deprivation of a driver's interest in the continued use and possession of his or her driver's license' and thus violated due process. Id. at 677. Pulfrey believes Moore renders void his arrest for driving while license suspended in the third degree. However, this result does not necessarily follow from our holding in Moore.  But we struck down only two sections of the broader driver's license chapter. Other sections were left untouched, and these sections provide a means for suspending a license. RCW 46.20.342(1)(c), the statute that defines driving while license suspended in the third degree, lists six different reasons for the suspension that render the offense a third degree violation, only one of which is now suspect because of Moore. Thus, for Pulfrey to benefit from our opinion in Moore, he must show that his license was suspended under the statutes declared unconstitutional.  The record in this case does not indicate why Pulfrey's license was suspended. He has not shown that his license was suspended under the unconstitutional statutes and therefore is not entitled to relief."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.




 

Decided 5/12/05 by the Washington Supreme Court --State v. Davis -- 6th Amendment Right of Confrontation -- 911 Calls --  HELD:  "We hold that emergency 911 calls should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and that the statements made should be individually evaluated for admissibility in light of the confrontation clause.  We hold that overwhelming untainted evidence supports Adrian Davis's conviction and that any error in admitting "testimonial" statements without cross-examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."   Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Justice Ireland.  Click Here to Read the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Sanders.  When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 3/31/05 by the Division III -- State v. Phillips -- Investigative Stops -- Random Check Reveals Owner of Vehicle Has Suspended Driver's License -- Visual Identity of Driver Prior to Stop NOT Required -- HELD:  "A law enforcement officer may stop a motorist and ask For identification when a random vehicle registration check discloses that the registered owner's driver's license has been suspended.  . .  We reject [Defendant's] argument that an investigative stop requires prior affirmative verification that the driver's appearance matches that of the registered owner." Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 2/22/05 by the Division I -- State v. Spring -- Search and Seizure -- Unlawful Entry Does Not Invalidate Subsequent Search Under Warrant if "unlawful entry did not prompt the decision to seek the warrant and the lawfully obtained evidence before the magistrate established probable cause to search." Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 2/1/05 by the Division I -- Lewis v. State -- DUI Investigation -- State v Gordon -- Audio Recording Between Investigating Officer and Suspect -- HELD:  ". . . police officers were not required to notify the drivers that they were making an audio recording"  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 1/27/05 by the Washington Supreme Court -- Kitsap County v. Matress Outlet  --  Constitutionality of Sign Ordinance -- Issue Presented:  "In this case we decide the constitutionality of Kitsap County's sign ordinance, which the county claims prohibits Mattress Outlet's use of raincoat-clad workers as offsite advertisements."  Admittedly, this is not the type of case which usually makes this page.  However, our own Honorable Steve Holman called this one correctly in the initial hearing.  Click Here to read his August 8, 2002 opinion.  This case generated some great concurring comments on the vagueness of the Kitsap County ordinance:

Decided 1/24/05 by the Division I -- State v Gordon -- Domestic Violence Designation --Not a Fact to Be Determined by Jury -- HELD:  "Defendants David Felix and Michael Hammond challenge under Blakely v. Washington the judicial finding that their crimes constituted
domestic violence.  But Blakely only requires juries to find facts that increase a defendant's potential punishment.  Felix and Hammond have identified no consequences of the finding that could have increased their punishment."   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 1/11/05 by the Division II -- Bremerton v. Tucker --DUI --  Consideration of Prior  Deferred Prosecution for Enhanced Sentencing Purposes --  FACTS:  Defendant plead guilty to a DUI.  He had previously completed a deferred prosecution.  The court "imposed the mandatory minimum sentence for a DUI offender with one prior offense, based on the defendant's previous deferred prosecution, pursuant to the provisions of RCW 46.61.5055.2.  HELD:  "[Defendant]  argues that the sentence enhancement violates due process because it relieves the State of its burden to prove all criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.  Holding that the DUI sentence-enhancement statute does not violate due process, we affirm."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.

 

Decided 1/11/05 by the Division II -- State v. Koch --DUI --  Under the facts of the case, it was harmless error to allow the state toxicologist to testify in violation of an in limine order.   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.

 

Decided 1/10/05 by the Division I -- State v. Cohen -- DUI -- Admissibility of Refusal to Take Breath Test -- No Necessity to Show Machine Was In Good Operating Order -- HELD:  "Results of a breath test are admissible only if the results are reliable, i.e., if the machine used to obtain the results was properly serviced and in good working order.  A driver's refusal to take the test is evidence of guilty knowledge, and is relevant whether or not the machine in the police station is working properly.  The driver's refusal to take the test is the relevant fact, not the condition of the machine.  Here, the district court judge ruled that a refusal to take the breath test is not relevant unless the test, if taken, would have been admissible.  This is error.  The evidentiary value of a driver's refusal to take the  test is unrelated to the qualifications of a machine never used."    Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.




 

Decided 12/21/04 by Division II --  UNPUBLISHED -- State v. Muddari -- Traffic Infractions -- Lack of Authority of Court to Amend Infraction --  FACTS:  " Washington State Patrol radar captured Eugene Muddari driving 102 miles per hour in a 70 mile per hour zone.  The officer cited Muddari for negligent driving.   Muddari requested a hearing in the Kelso district court.  Neither the
State prosecutor nor the citing officer attended the hearing.  Muddari, appearing with counsel, argued that the negligent driving infraction could not stand because an element of negligence was not in evidence danger to others.  Agreeing, the trial court found that the facts did not support the
negligent driving infraction.  The trial court also found that Muddari had been speeding and that the
evidence necessarily supported that charge."  HELD:  "Here, when the district court found insufficient evidence of negligent driving, it properly dismissed the charge.  But with the prosecutor not present to amend the charge, the district court had no power to substitute a speeding infraction, even though supported by the evidence.  Instead, its dismissal of the negligent driving infraction should have ended the State's case against Muddari." Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.

 

Decided 11/9/04 by the United States Supreme Court -- Leocal v. Ashcroft -- Effect of DUI Conviction on Potential Deportation of Alien -- Held:  State DUI offenses which either do not have a mens rea component or require only a showing of negligence in the operation of a vehicle, are not crimes of violence under 18 U. S. C. Section 16 which can support deportation.  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 11/2/04 by the Division II -- State v. Powers -- Admissibility of 911 Tapes -- HELD:  "We hold that the 911 tape in this case was inadmissible because its purpose was to report Powers so authorities would apprehend him; it was not made under the stress of an immediate threat of harm, nor was Powers still present. . .   We reject the State's request for a bright line rule admitting all 911 recordings because such a rule would likely result in the vice Crawford seeks to redress: A 'capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.'  124 S.Ct. at 1371.  Instead, we hold that the trial court, on a case-by-case basis, can best assess the proposed admission of a 911 recording as testimonial or nontestimonial and whether the statement originates from interrogation."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.

 

Decided 10/14/04 by the Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Eckblad -- Constitutionality of Washington's Seat Belt Statute:   Majority Held:  "[W]e conclude that the statute is not facially void,  and [Defendant] does not establish it is void as applied to the facts of his case. . . We caution that we do not hold that the statute is immune from a future due process challenge.  Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Justice Chambers.  Click Here to Read the Dissent by Justice Sanders.  When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

  Decided 10/14/04 by the Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Maddox --  Probable Cause -- Redetermination by Magistrate Where Information Received After Issuance But Before Service Negatively Impacts Probable Cause.  HELD:  "We hold that when law enforcement receives information that, if believed, negates probable cause, the officers must return to the magistrate for reevaluation of probable cause."   NOTE:  Both the majority and dissent agree with this statement of the law.  The two disagree whether the facts presented in this case required a reevaluation of probable cause.  Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Justice Ireland.  Click Here to Read the Dissent by Justice Alexander.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

  Decided 10/14/04 by the Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Bradshaw and Latovlovici--  ISSUE PRESENTED: Should State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 635 P.2d 435 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982), be overrulled to require an intent element in the crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance?  HELD:  NO.  Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Justice Fairhurst.  Click Here to Read the Dissent by Justice Sanders.  When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 8/2/04 by the Division I -- State v. Thaves --  UNPUBLISHED OPINION -- Thanks to Judge Steve Dwyer for this cite -- Blakely v Washington does not require a jury to determine whether an offense is a domestic violence offense.  In other words, in an Assault 4/DV case the DV question does not need to be submitted to the jury. Click Here to Read the Court's Per Curium Opinion.   When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 7/8/04 by the Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Gaddy -- Search and Seizure -- Evidence of Separate Crime Obtained During Search Incident to Arrest for DWLS -- Information Received from DOL is Presumptively Reliable -- HELD:  "[Defendant] was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance.  The substance, cocaine, was discovered in [Defendant's] car when the police searched it incident to her arrest for driving while license suspended.  The Court of Appeals affirmed [Defendant's] conviction, concluding that information the arresting officer received from the Department of Licensing (DOL) was presumptively reliable and that the arresting officer, therefore, had probable cause to arrest Gaddy.  We affirm the Court of Appeals. . . .  we conclude that the DOL records are presumptively reliable.  We conclude, additionally, that [Defendant] failed to rebut this presumption.  At her suppression hearing, [Defendant] argued only that her driving records were inaccurate.  To prevail on a reliability challenge, it would have been necessary for [Defendant] to make at least a prima facie showing that accuracy of the DOL records are affected by systemic problems in maintaining accurate and reliable records of the millions of drivers it oversees."   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Chief Justice Alexander.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 7/1/04 by the Washington Supreme Court -- Seattle v. Clark-Munoz -- BAC Thermometers -- Failure to Prove Thermometers Were Traceable to Standards Maintained by NIST --  Summary Courtesy of Pam Loginski:  :  "In the opinion, the Court holds that the breath tests were properly suppressed due to the failure to prove that the thermometers were traceable to standards maintained by NIST.  'To be traceable, the uncertainties must be measured and recorded at each level.'  The Court, however, specifically indicated that '[o]n the record berfore us, we do not reach whether a breath test machine may be retroactively certified.'  The Court also holds that breath test results that are not admissible under the per se prong, may not be admissible as 'other evidence' of intoxication."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Justice Chambers.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 6/24/04 by the Washington Supreme Court -- Dreiling v. Jain -- Standard for Sealing Court Records in Civil Proceeding -- Court Applies Approach in Criminal Proceedings Announced in  Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa,  97 Wn.2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982).   RATIONALE:  "'Justice in all cases shall be administered openly. . . .'  Const. art. I, sec. 10.  The open operation of our courts is of utmost public importance.  Justice must be conducted openly to foster the public's understanding and trust in our judicial system and to give judges the check of public scrutiny.  Secrecy fosters mistrust. This openness is a vital part of our constitution and our history.  The right of the public, including the press, to access trials and court records may be limited only to protect significant interests, and any limitation must be carefully considered and specifically justified."  Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Chief Justice Chambers.   Click Here to Read the Concurring Opinion by Justice Fairhurst.  When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.
   
 

Decided 6/22/04 by the Division III -- Spokane v. Ward --  Recovery of Costs in Traffic Infraction Proceeding -- FACTS:  Defendant appealed his finding of committed to Superior Court, prevailed, and was granted costs of appeal by the Superior Court.  Statute prohibits the award of costs in infraction proceedings (RCW 46.63.151).  Court Rule allows costs to prevailing parties on appeal from court of limited jurisdiction judgment (RALJ 9.).   HELD:  NO COSTS ALLOWED " [t]he statutory prohibition against an award of costs prevails over the rule providing forcosts on appeal. . ."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Judge Schultheis.   When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 6/10/04 by the Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Rankin -- Right to Privacy -- Is Right to Privacy under Washington Constitution Article I, Section 7 Violated When Police Officer Requests Identification From a Passenger in a Lawfully Stopped Vehicle Where Officer has No Articulable Suspicion Passenger has Engaged in Criminal Activity?  HELD:  YES.   Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Chief Justice Alexander.   Click Here to Read the Concurring Opinion by Justice Fairhurst.  Click Here to Read the Dissent by Justice Ireland.  When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 6/3/04 by the Washington Supreme Court -- Redmond v. Moore -- RCW 46.20.289 and RCW 46.20.324(1) Violate Procedural Due Process by NOT Affording an Administrative Hearing Prior to or After a License Suspension by DOL. 5 TO 4 DECISION:  MAJORITY HELD:  "RCW 46.20.289 and .324(1) are contrary to the guaranty of due process because they do not provide adequate procedural safeguards to ensure against the erroneous deprivation of a driver's interest in the continued use and possession of his or her driver's license." Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Justice Sanders.   The Dissent Responds:  "The majority seizes upon the scant record in these cases to answer a question that has not been raised by any party and in so doing stretches the requirements of due process beyond precedent and common sense--establishing no clear benefit to licensees and burdening an administrative system designed by the legislature to provide swift determination for the protection of the motoring public."  Click Here to Read the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Bridge.   When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 4/27/04 by the Division II -- Bremerton v. Bradshaw -- DUI Sentencing -- Must Court Grant Credit for Predisposition EHM when Sentencing a Third Time Offender?  HELD:  "The question is whether a trial court sentencing a third-time DUI offender under RCW 46.61.5055(3)(b) must grant credit, against mandatory jail time, for time served on electronic home monitoring prior to trial.  The answer is no."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Judge Morgan.   When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 3/18/04 by the Washington Supreme Court -- Washington State Council of County  & City Employees et al V. Susan Hahn and Ruth Reukauf -- Collective Bargaining -- Obligation of Court to Bargain Over Non Wage Related Concerns -- FACTS:  Plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus from Supreme Court requiring Yakima County Superior and District Court judges "to engage in collective bargaining over the nonwage related employment concerns of employees who are under the supervision of the courts."  HELD:  "We hold that the remedy petitioners seek is not available because they possess an adequate remedy at law under the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA), chapter 41.56 RCW.  We, therefore, dismiss their petition."   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Chief Justice Alexander.   When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 3/9/04 by the Division III -- Ledgerwood v. Lansdowne --Anti Harassment Petitions -- Superior Court's Constitutional Grant of Original Jurisdiction Includes Right to Hear Such Petitions -- HELD:  "The central question presented by this appeal is whether the Washington constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to the superior courts includes original jurisdiction of antiharassment proceedings (chapter 10.14 RCW).  We conclude that it does.  Although RCW 10.14.150 gives the district courts jurisdiction to consider antiharassment petitions, we conclude that this jurisdiction is not exclusive."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Judge Sweeney.   When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

  Decided 3/8/04 by the United States Supreme Court -- Crawford v. Washington --Non Admissibility of Unavailable Witness's Statements -- Right of Confrontation -- From the Court's Syllabus:  "Petitioner was tried for assault and attempted murder.  The State souht to intoduce a recorded statement that petitioner's wife Sylvia had made duringpolice interrogation, as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense.  Sylvia did not testify at trial because of Washington's marital privilege. . . .Held:  The State's use of Sylvia's statement violated the Confrontation Clause because, where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is confrontation."   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Justice Scalia and the Concurring Opinion by Justice Rehnquist.   This opinion is in Adobe Acrobat Format.   If You Do Not Have the Adobe® Acrobat® Reader, you may download it by clicking the logo here  . When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 2/23/04 by Division II -- State v. Pulfrey --  Officer's Decision to Always Make Full Custodial Arrest of Persons Suspected of DWLS 3d -- Court Will Not Require Officer to Exercise Discretion to Cite and Release Rather than Arrest -- "[Defendant] argues that based on this testimony, the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence found during the search incident, in that the officer's categorical refusal to exercise the discretion granted by statute to issue a citation and notice to appear, in lieu of making a custodial arrest for this offense, violated the statute, thereby making the custodial arrest unlawful.  But our Supreme Court has ruled that no additional justification beyond probable cause need be shown where custodial arrest is authorized by statute, as it is here.  Accordingly, we decline to extend judicial oversight of police decisions regarding custodial arrest beyond the determination of probable cause, and affirm the trial court's ruling denying [Defendant's] motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search incident to [Defendant's] custodial arrest.   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Judge Kennedy.   When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.


 

Decided 2/5/04 by Division III -- Leininger v. Department of Licensing --  DUI Implied Consent Proceedings -- Arresting Officer is NOT Required to Provide Defendant With a List of "After Hours" Attorneys -- THE COURT'S REASONING:  " A driver arrested for driving while under the influence has no right to an attorney for the implied consent proceedings.  Police may be required to clarify any 'objective and unequivocal' confusion over the consequences of a refusal to take a breath test.  Here, [Defendant], after being arrested for driving while under the influence, did not express confusion over the specific implied consent warnings, but rather over what he should do.  Police provided him with a phone book and permitted him to call his wife.  She gave him the name and telephone number of his attorney.  Despite this, he failed to provide a breath sample.  The 'confusion' expressed by [Defendant] is not the type which the officer is required to dispel.  We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court.  It would have required that the officer provide [Defendant] with a list of 'after hours' attorneys."   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Judge Sweeney   When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

  Decided 2/3/04 by Division III -- State v. Radka --   Custodial Arrest for Purposes of Search Incidental Thereto -- What Constitutes -- FACTS:  "[Defendant] was stopped for a traffic violation and arrested for driving with a suspended license.  During a search incident to the arrest, the officer found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the vehicle.  [Defendant] was then arrested for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.  At the pretrial suppression hearing, the arresting officer admitted that he had intended to release Mr. Radka with a citation until he found the drug paraphernalia.  Finding that the search was unlawful because it was incident to a noncustodial arrest, the trial court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the case.  The State appeals, contending the trial court's ruling is contrary to prevailing case law."  HELD:  " Because we find that a reasonable person would not consider the arrest custodial, we affirm."Click Here to Read the Majority Opinion by Judge Schultheis.   Click Here to Read the Dissenting Opinion by Judge Brown.  ("Before searching [Defendant's]'s car, Deputy Ronald Nye announced to [Defendant] that he was under arrest for driving with his license suspended as is authorized under RCW 10.31.100(3)(e).  Before searching [Defendant's] car, Deputy Nye then physically placed [Defendant] in the back of his patrol car.  'At that point, a reasonable person in {Defendant's} position would not believe himself free to leave.'  State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 499, 62 P.3d 489 (2003).  The deputy's unspoken subjective plan is irrelevant, as is whether or not [Defendant] retained his cell phone or was handcuffed when locked in the patrol car.  Our framework is objective.  State v. Mennegar, 114 Wn.2d 304, 310-11, 787 P.2d 1347 (1990).  We should reject [Defendant's] suggestion to engage in a speculative analysis based upon an officer's subjective thought processes.  In my view, [Defendant] was objectively seized and under custodial arrest when the search occurred.  Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding the search was not incident to a custodial arrest.")   When you have read either of these opinions, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 1/15/04 by Washington Supreme Court -- State v. Green -- Ongoing Crimes -- Failure to Transfer Title Misdemeanor is NOT an Ongoing Crime -- FACTS:  Defendant was stopped on a traffic stop for failing to transfer title.  Deputies arrested Defendant, searched her vehicle and found controlled substances.  Conviction for controlled substances was REVERSED.  HELD:  "Under the common law, and since 1969 by statute, a law enforcement officer cannot generally make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor unless the crime is committed in the officer's presence. RCW 10.31.100; City of Tacoma v. Harris, 73 Wn.2d 123, 126, 436 P.2d 770 (1968).1 Some offenses, for purposes of determining when they are committed, can be considered continuing offenses. But the doctrine of continuing offenses should be employed sparingly, and only when the legislature expressly states the offense is a continuing offense, or when the nature of the offense leads to a reasonable conclusion that the legislature so intended." Click Here to Read the Court's Per Curiam Opinion.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 11/18/03 by Division II -- State v. Ettenhoffer --   Telephonic Search Warrants -- Necessity of Reducing Warrant to Writing Prior to Execution -- HELD:  "[Defendant]  was convicted of manufacture of a controlled substance marijuana.  He appeals, alleging that the failure to have a written warrant to search his property requires suppression of the marijuana.  Although officers gave a telephonic statement in applying for a search warrant and a judge determined that probable cause existed, nobody executed a written warrant, affixed the authorizing court's signature to a warrant, or gave [Defendant] a copy of a warrant.  We hold that these failures constitute a warrantless search in violation of CrR 2.3(c), RCW 10.79.040, and article 1, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.  Suppression is the appropriate remedy.  We reverse [Defendant's] conviction." Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Judge Bridgewater.    When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 10/21/03 by Division II -- Mortell v. State -- Misdemeanor Stacking -- Right of Limited Jurisdiction Court to Enter Consecutive Sentences Totalling More Than One Year -- HELD:  "Upon conviction, the district court ordered the sentences on all counts to run consecutively for a total of 585 days in county jail.  The State appeals the granting of a writ of habeas corpus releasing Mortell from custody and voiding the portion of his sentence that exceeded one year.  We hold that RCW 3.66.060, which provides for the criminal jurisdiction of district court, is ambiguous as to whether the district court can impose a sentence for longer than one year at a single sentencing.  But we interpret RCW 3.66.060 in conjunction with several other statutes, i.e., RCW 9A.20.021, 9.92.020, 9.92.080, and 70.48.020, and hold that in order to harmonize the statutory scheme and avoid absurd results, RCW 3.66.060 permits the district court to sentence for each count, regardless of whether the total sentence exceeds one year.  We reverse."  Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Judge Bridgewater.    When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.



 

Decided 9/11/03 by Washington Supreme Court -- City of Seattle v. Guay -- Speedy Trial --  Courts of Limited Jurisdiction -- Due Diligence in Securing Presence of Defendant Held in Another Jurisdiction -- HELD:  "We hold that there is no mechanism available to courts of limited jurisdiction to facilitate and compel the transport of misdemeanant defendants between county jails of this state.  We distinguish between being amenable to criminal process and being amenable to transport to court.  While courts of limited jurisdiction have the inherent authority to issue a transfer order to obtain a misdemeanant defendant's presence in court, this authority does not establish a mechanism that compels the holding county to release the defendant.  We hold that CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5) does not contain a due diligence or good faith requirement because the rule's plain language does not reflect such obligations.  As such, the time during which each Petitioner was incarcerated in another county is excluded from their speedy trial calculations.  We therefore affirm the denial of each Petitioner's motion to dismiss."   Click Here to Read the Court's Opinion by Justice Ireland.    Click Here to Read the Dissenting  Opinion by Justice Sanders.  When you have read this opinion, click on your Browser's Back Button to return to this page.